U A 

,a4 



[La^civUA, 






.?. 



VJ 






9/f 



ARMY AND NAVY MANUAL FOR DEBATERS AND 
OTHERS.— FACTS SHOWN BY EXTRACTS FROM 
THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.— I CHALLENGE 
CONTRADICTION OF THESE FACTS. 



EXTENSION OF REMARKS 



HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER 



HOUSE OF KEPRESENTATIVES 



JANUARY 14, 1915 



77415—14117 



WASHINGTON 
1015 







0, of D. 
.AR 31 19 5 



5 '^ 



^ 



Army and Navy Manual for Debaters an«l Others — Facts 
Shown by Extracts from the Otiicial Documents — I Chal- 
lenge Contradiction of These Facts. 



EXTENSION OF REMARKS 

OF 

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GAllDNEE, 

OF MASSACHUSETTS, 

Ix THE House of Representatives, 
Thursday, January i//, 1915. 

Mr. GAIiDNER. Mr. Speaker, \vc are the most prosperous 
Nation on earth, autl to the south of us lies the wonderful South 
American Continent, which we have closed to European coloni- 
zation by the Monroe doctrine. I simply can not understand 
how any intelligent student of history can fail to see that we 
are impotent to defend ourselves and to enforce the jNIonroe 
doctrine by moral suasion and financial might alone. 

The state of our national defenses ought to be looked into 
and a comprehensive plan for the future prepared. This in-' 
quiry and report should be made by an independent commission, 
so that unprejudiced minds may be brought to bear on the ques- 
tion. The work can not be done by existing committees of the 
House and Senate, first, because eight separate committees of 
the two bodies have jurisdiction of different parts of our na- 
tional-defense problem; second, because the older members of 
all those committees, especially in the House, must necessarily 
be prejudiced in favor of their own work done in the past. 

OUR NEEDS. 

The General Board of the Navy, of which Admiral Dewey is 
chairman, is the official adviser of the Navy Department. 

For many years the General Board has reported that for pur- 
poses of defense against the strongest nation, except Great Brit- 
ain, as a foundation of fighting ships we need 48 battleships, 
less than 20 years old, and 192 destroyers. 

Instead of this we have built, building, or authorized only 
37 battleships less than 20 j-ears old, and G8 destroyers. 

Admiral Badger, recently commander in chief of the Atlantic 
Fleet, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt have 
testified that we need 71,000 men to man only that part of our 

77415—14417 3 



present fleet wliicli \YOuld be useful in time of war and to per- 
form necessary shore duties. This estimate malces no allow- 
ance for the additional trained men required for signal and 
tactical work, etc., on board all the auxiliary vessels, which we 
must obtain in case of war, nor does it allow for tlie additional 
men needed to man the warships now under construction. 

Instead of this we have only 52,300 men. 

Admiral Badger and Admiral Yreeland testified that we 
need 100 submarines. (Admiral Yreeland testified that we 
needed that number for harbor defense alone.) 

We have only 58 submarines built, building, or authorized, 'and 
many of them are absolutely obsolete and worthless. 

We need an ample supply of aeroplanes and a few Zeppelins 
or other type of dirigibles. 

We have only 23 aeroplanes (none of them armored) and not 
a single Zeppelin or other dirigible. 

We need as big guns in our coast defenses as the modern 
foreign superdreadnaughts carry. The most powerful cannon 
in any fortification on the Atlantic coast are only 12-inch guns. 
Sui)erdreadnaughts of the Queen Ellzaheth type each carry 
eight 15-inch guns. 

We need a large number of men in the Naval Militia and 
a large number -of men in the Naval Reserves. 

We have only 7,700 men in the Naval Militia, we have no 
Naval Reserve, and sailors in the merchant marine are not 
trained for the highly specialized duties of modern men-of- 
wars-men. 

According to the estimate of the General Staff of the Army, 
prepared before the outbreak of the European war, we need a 
field army of 400,000 men, composed of regulars, militiamen, 
and reserves, ready to take the field at once at the outbreak of 
war. 

According to the Secretary of War's annual report, we have 
only 29,405 regulars available for a field army, together witli 
119,087 militiamen if they all came to the front in time of war, 
and IG men in the Army Reserve. 

According to the last report of the Chief of Staff, United 
States Army, we need 11,790,850 rounds of artillery ammuni- 
tion and 64G.OOO.00O rounds of rifle ammunition. 

Instead of this, we have on hand and being manufactured 
only 580.098 rounds of artillery ammunition and 241,000,000 
rounds of rifle ammunition. 

According to this same report we need 2,834 field and artil- 
lery guns. Instead of this we have on hand or being manu- 
factured only 852 field artillery guns. 
77415—14417 



We neetl a supply of heavy field artillery siu-li as the armies 
of Europe are using— Oil-inch ho\Yitzors, ]2i-infh howitzers, ami 
perhaps even lOJ-inoh howitzers, lilvc the gigantic German guns. 

We have only thirty-two G-inch howitzers ami smaller pieces, 
but none larger. 

THE NAVT. 

[Extracts from testimony by Congressman GAKDX?:n before the House 
Committee on Naval Affairs. From official printed report of com- 
mittee.] 

Out of 33 completed battleships do you know that 12 of thorn are 
unfitted for service without long delay? That is all on account of the 
refusal to pay the bill for manning them properly. AVe have 33 battle- 
ships, and 12 of them are in cold storage, where we can not get them 
when wo want them. (P. lOGO.) 

Do yOu know that if we had gone to v."ar with the rest of the civilized 
world at the beginning of last August that nine of our battleships 
would not be ready to fight yet? We havo three battleships in reserve, 
six in ordinary, and three out of commission. That is to say, we have 
three battleships that need to be put in training, we havo six of what 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt calls the grayboards of the 
fleet, and we have three in their second childhood. That is the situa- 
tion in regard to the battleships, and he tells us that to put the ves- 
sels in " reserve " into fighting trim takes three months, and that to 
put the six battleships that are in " ordinary " into fighting trim will 
take six months, and that would mean the 1st of February, if we had 
gone to war with the rest of the powers. (P. 1060.) (Reference: 
Hearings, Roosevelt testimony, pp. 939, 940, 942.) 

Now, in company with those battleships, to keep them company in 
cold storage, let us see what wo havo. Wo havo 15 cruisers, 22 de- 
stroyers, 18 torpedo boats, 12 submarines, and perhaps a dozen mis- 
cellaneous fighting ships kept in cold storage with the battleships. In 
other woi'ds, we have 80 or more fighting vessels of our modest Navy 
not fit for battle in case of an emergency. (P. 1001.) (Reference, 
Asst. Sec. of Navy Roosevelt press memo., Oct. 21, 1914.) 

* * « « « * * 

We have had testimony here before this committee that it would take 
five years to get a reserve of 25,000 sailors. (P. J 001.) 

I charge that our Navy is 18,000 enlisted mcu short of the number 
of men that thoy ought to have in poaca as a preparation for war, 
and, in addition to that, there is a shortage of 4,000 more men in 
sight. That is, there will be an increase required of 4,000 more men 
to man the vessels coming in commission in 1915 and 1916. (P. lOGl.) 

* * * * « * * 

In support of my charge I call to witness the evidence of Assistant 
Secretary Roosevelt, and I also cite the evidence of Rear Admiral 
Charles J. Badger as it appears on page 482 of your hearings. Both 
of these men say the Navy is 18,000 men short, not counling the sailors 
needed for the vessels now building. (P. 1061.) (Reference: Hearings; 
evidence of Admiral Badger and lion. F. D. Roosevelt, December, 1914.) 

4= « « 4> « • • 

77415—14417 



The General Board, which actually has made out our war plans, 
estimates the enlisted forces of the Navy as between 30,000 and 50,000 
men short for war. (P. 1061. Reference: Hearings, evidence of Hon. 
F. D. Roosevelt.) 

**♦••*• 
How about air craft? Other nations have been developing air craft. 
Before the war broke out France had 1,400 aeroplanes and Germany 
had 1.000 aeroplanes, with other nations in close pursuit. At that 
time Servia had three times as many aeroplanes as Uncle Sam (p. 1065). 
Uncle Sam had 23, while one of the other nations had 1,400 ; and of 
the 2,3 v/hicli Uncle Sam had, half of them were in the Army and the 
other half in the Navy, and they were of the oldest type, and none of 
them were armored (p. 1065). 

******* 
Now, how about the dirigibles and Zeppelins? How many of these 
do you suppose we have? Uncle Sam has not one single, solitary airship 
of that kind with which to lace his enemy. (P. 1065. Reference: 
Hearings, evidence of Capt. Bristol.) Page 299 of Capt. Bristol's evi- 
dence before the committee shows that France has 22 dirigibles and 
1,400 aeroplanes ; Russia, 18 dirigibles and 800 aeroplanes ; Great 
Britain, 9 dirigibles and 400 aeroplanes ; Belgium, 2 dirigibles and 
100 aeroplanes ; Germany, 40 dirigibles and 1,000 aeroplanes ; Austria, 
400 aeroplanes and S dirigibles ; and the United States 23 aeroplanes 
(p. 1066). 

******* 
We have, as I said, a dozen aeroplanes in the Navy, and I am in- 
formed, or was informed in October last, that only seven of those could 
get out of their own way (p. 1067). So last year the aeroplane 
board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to investigate the whole 
question recommended an appropriation of $1,300,000 for that year ; 
and that is as far as they ever got, because, according to the evidence 
of Capt. Bristol, we let the Aviation Service spend the magnificent sum 
of $350,000 last year (p. 1067). 

******* 

Speaking of the relative standing of the United State.? Navy- 
Let us see how we stood on July 1, 1914, as compared with other 
nations. On that date the war tonnage of Great Britain was 2,157,000 ; 
the war tonnage of Germany was 951,710 ; the United States had 
765,133 tons. (Page 1075. Reference: War Ship Tonnage Bulletin, 
United States Navy Department, July 1, 1914.) 

******* 
Now let us see how we would have stood if all the vessels which were 
building on July 1, 1914, had been complete. This is the total of the 
war tonnage built and building July 1, 1914 : Under those circumstances 
Great Britain would have 2,700,000 tons; Germany, 1,300,000 tons. 
Who do you suppose comes third? France would be third with 899,000 
tons and the United States fourth with 894,000 tons. (Pages 1075 and 
1070. Reference as above.) 

Did you know that only 1 submarine out of 12 on the Atlantic coast 
was in condition to dive when the mobilization was ordered last No- 
vember? (Reference: Hearings, Commander Stirling's evidence.) 
77415—14417 



ADMir.AL FISKE'S VIEWS. 

[Extracts from testimony l)j- Uoar Admiral Bradloy A. Fiskc before the 
House Committee on Naval Affairs, from oflieial printed report of 
committee.] 

I think, of course, it is very well known wc are beliind otlicr na- 
tions — for instance, tbe two great naval nations in Europe — in tbe 
matter of mines and air craft. I tbiuk that in case of an attack on our 
coasts by one of those powers our inadequacy would be very keenly 
felt. (I'. 1007. ■) 

« * * . * * * ♦ 

As to scout ships, the policy of tbe General Hoard is to cut down 
what we think wc really ought to have, because if we told Congress 
what we really think we ought to have they would say we arc crazy. 
(P. 1017.) 

*«***♦* 

I would say it would take about five years to get ready with our Navy 
to fight successfully and effectively against an effective navy. (P. 1023.) 
I am not thinking so much of the material of the ships as of the 
operations. 'What I have in mind all the time is what I would do if we 
were to have war to-morrow or next mouth. When I think of the num- 
ber of things that we would have to do iu order to get the Navy into 
really effective shape — by which I mean having plans, plans of prepa- 
ration and plans of conduct of the war, and properly drilled mine layers 
and mine sweepers, and the aeronautical branch — when I think of all 
that has to be done iu preparing general plans and detail plans of war, 
in getting the peisonnel enlisted and trained, ready to tight our battle- 
ships that are now in reserve and in ordinary, and fi^ire it all out, I 
conclude that it will take at least five years. (P. 1024.) I doubt if in 
live years we could get the Navy up to a state of efficiency, for in- 
stance, such as that of oue of the navies of Europe now. I doubt it 
very much. (P. 1024.) 

******* 

We lack a general staff, which shall arrange the plans, that is funda- 
mental ; wo have not enough personnel to man all the ships. We have 
not any mining equipment to speak of, or any aeronautical equipment or 
personnel. Besides the battleships we need small auxiliaries in the 
fleet, such as have been proposed by the General Board. (P. 1047.) 
* * * * * * * 

Mr. (JuAY. lias it not been said. Admiral, that to make effective even 
the ships we have, we need more scout cruisers? I believe you testified 
to that this morning. I believe, even to make more effective the ships 
we already have, we need an increase in scout cruisers. 

Admiral FiSKE. To make the Navy more effective ; yes. 

Mr. GitAV. And we need more air craft, you say, to make effective the 
Navy we have now? 

Admiral Fiske. Yes. 

Mr. GuAY. And wo need more submarines, you say, to make effective 
the ships W! now have? 

Admiral Fiske. I do not think I said submarines. I said mines. 

Mr. Gkay. It also has been said here that we need submarines. 

Admiral Fi.ske. Yes ; I agree with that ; but I think I spoke of mines. 

Mr. Gray. And we need more destroyers to make more effective tbe 
ships we now have. Is not that true? 

Admiral Fiske. Yes. 

. 77415— 14417 



8 

Mr. Grat. Aud, also, we require more oflScers, do we not, to make 
effective tbe ships that we now have? 

Admiral Fiske. Yes. 

Mr. Gray. And we require more training for those men to make more 
effective the ships that we now have? 

AdmiralPiSKE. Yes. (t. 1050.) 

******* 

It would he necessary to supply submarines for only a few individual 
harbors. That is a small part of the problem. Most all of them should 
go with the fleet. But in the Canal Zone, which is the most vulnerable 
part of our entire possessions, anybody can go there and take it that 
wants to; I think we should have a few submarines. (P. 1053.) 

NO DEFINITE POLICY. 

[Extract from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, 1913.] 

The absence of any definite naval policy on our part, except in the 
General Board, and the failure of the people, the Congress, and the 
executive government to recognize the necessity for such a policy has 
already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war ; 
and this inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until 
the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into 
operation. 

[Extracts from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, November 
17, 1914.] 
This shows that we are now deficient 10 battleships, built, building, 
and authorized, "trom that contemplated in the 1903 program. (P. 50.) 
******* 
The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated 
for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the 
country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the 
Nation without being a protection. (P. 56.) 

******* 

The General Board in its indorsement No. 449 of August CO, 1013, 
and accompanying memorandum brought to the attention of the depart- 
ment the dangerous situation of the country in the lack of air craft and 
air men in both the naval and military services. (P. 58.) 

******* 

At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of air 
craft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not 
more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have 
too little speed and carrying capacity for service work. (1'. 59.) 
******* 

In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the 
past year and the demonstration now being made of the vital impor- 
tance of a proper service to both land and sea warfare, our' present 
situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now 
developed air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is 
difiicult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities. (P. 59.) 
******* 

In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe 
possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. (P. 50.) 
77415—14417 



THE TOnrEDO SITUATION. 

[Extract from the report of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, Chief of the 
Bureau of Ordinance, United States Navy.] 

The torpedo situation is developing very satisfactorily with the ex- 
ception of modern torpedoes for battlesliips anterior to the Nevada and 
Oklahoma, for cruisers of the Tennessee class, and for the scouts. At 
present all these vessels are equipped with a short-range torpedo which 
may he considered obsolete for the battle fleet. (P. 8.) 

Note. — As neither the Nccada nor Oklahoma is yet completed, this 
statement means that every United States battleship afloat is equipped 
with obsolete torpedoes. — A, r. G. 

THE ALTANTIC SUBMARINE FLOTU-LA, 

[Extract from the evidence of Commander Yates Stirling, jr., December 
15, 1914.] 

Representative Roberts. I am asking you that question because some 
newspapers state that there is only 1 submarine out of the 17 that will 
dive. 

Commander Stirling. I think I can explain where they got that 
impression. The commander in chief ordered a mobilization of the 
Atlantic submarine flotilla at Ilampton Roads on the 1st of November 
of all available vessels. He left it to me to say what vessels I would 
bring down there. He did not consider the 5 at Colon. That reduced 
the submarine flotilla to 12. * * * So when we got down there 
the admiral wanted to know what we could do. I told him we had 
then only 1 submarine that I thought could elficieutly take part in 
the maneuvers at sea off the coast. (I'. 800.) 
77415—1-1417 



10 



a 5 



g c » 



SB 



^2 



Orirf'T-iCNMOO 



I- (?■» CO CD rH CO l-^ 



Oi o CO lO r- ■<?' c 

■^ r-l CC (N rH C 



CO CO o 00 W5 c; CO t-i 






CO r-lCI rH 



CirrOOlMOOO 



OOlNOOCOt^OOO 



OCOOO'PCIOCOCO 






77415—14417 



a tea 2 Is 



S<J 



la 



5 '3 



•2 '«'S^„a; 



CS r-d-HC-l r-l 



OOOOOOIM ■ 



--I ■* w m CI 3 >ra 



3S' 



t>.iOOOO(300JO 



iH'^OOCS-^OO 



O l» 'I' 40 ■* I- t' 



a q3 a 2&-^ S 



S a 



h' 


0.2) 




1-1 ja 


o 
o 


ti 


rt 


■a n 


ft 






o.a 


tij 


Oj « 









.S =" 



.2 H i> 

!5 -^ S3 



11 



(© t^ >c c. '^ c/: 'o v3 
cTi-T 



'C >;. . M • • • . 

*^ a o o c3 ■- .■ ti 






(u " a 



77415- 



c3 n *j a cs >^ 
-14417 





^__, 


1 






















33 










(V^ 




1— f 


(». 


'■'I 














































« 




ri 


o 


C3 




&i 








Kj 




















a 


S 






f^ 






rt 


"^ m 


c5 






c5 
Pot 


S 








Cl 


n 




. C3 


p> 














o 






c» 


■T3 
Cl 


s 


03 


o 














W 












a 








a 




■o 




a 




C3 
















© 




O 












a 








o 




E- 


< 1 



12 

The Akmt. 

[Statement by Congressman Gaedxer to House Committee on Military 

Affairs, January 4, 1915.] 

SOLDIEHS. 

Tiiere arc 29,405 regular United States soldiers available for a field 
army, according to Secretary of War Garrison. If all of them were 
ordered into trenches, they could man a single line about 14 miles long. 
There are 110,087 militiamen or national guardsmen in the United 
States, and there are just 10 men in the United States reserve. In 
other words, until a new army could be organized, drilled, and equipped 
we have just 148,508 men to summon to take the field. If every one of 
them answers the summons, they can man a single line of trenches 
about 65 miles long, just about two-thirds the circumference of Greater 
New York, by the way. 

Our whole field array — militia, regulars, and all — would just about 
garrison Paris. 

But can our militia all be counted on to stem the first onslaught ot 
invasion? Has history shown us any such thing? Is it not a fact that 
before militia is to be relied upon it must go through an arduous train- 
ing in a camp of instruction? Will even the best friend of the Militia 
or National Guard, whichever you call it, claim that it is to-day in a 
healthy state? 

How can anyone make such a claim? The Chief of Staff tells us 
that in the last year, out of 120,000 militiamen, 23,000 failed to present 
themselves for the annual inspection, 31,000 absented themselves from 
the annual encampment, and 44,000 never appeared on the rifle range 
from one year's end to the other. 

AEIILLEUY. 

The Russian Army in a single battle of the Japanese War had 1,204 
flcld guns engaged. Japan had 922 guns extending over the same 
front. (Fortifications bill hearing, Dec. 9, 1913.) 

V>'e have in our possession only 634 completed modern field guns and 
howitzers altogether. (Letter from Secretary Garrison to Repre- 
sentative A. P. GardneUj Dec. 23, 1914.) 

That is to say, we own a little over half the guns which Russia had 
at the battle of Mukden. Yet any ordinary engagement of this Eu- 
ropean war makes the battle of Mukden look like a peace conference. 

Gen. Witherspoon, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, tells us 
in his recent report that European armies average more than 5 field 
guns for each 1,000 men. So our G34 guns would only equip a modest 
little army of 127,000. To be sure, we have appropriated for 220 
more guns, but they are not ready. 

In the testimony before the Fortifications Committee in 19i;'. it ap- 
peared that Russia has 6,000 field guns, France 4,800, and Germany 
about 5,000. It will take us quite a while to raise our modest 634 to 
those figures if the information given us by the War Department is cor- 
rect. Last session Gen. Wood testified that tlie entire capacity of this 
country, working night and day, is 500 guns in a year. 

AMMUNITION. 

After all, what good would the guns be without ammunition? The 
Secretary of War expects us to have 580,000 rounds of Artillery am- 
munition ready by July 1. I hope he is right. It is worth remember- 
ing that in a single battle of the Japanese war Russia shot away 
nearly half that amount. Gen. Wood tells us that 200 rounds of ammu- 
nition a day is a fair expenditure for a gun under battle conditions, so 
you see that our 634 guns can next July be provided with just about 
four days' ammunition apiece, if Secretary Garrison's hopes are fulfilled. 
77415—14417 



13 

Last year tlio Ordnauce Department estimated that tbe Government 
arsenals, running niglit and day, with three shifts, can turn out ],G00 
rounds of Artillery ammunition daily. In other words, eight field guns 
can shoot away ammunition just as fast as Uncle Sam can make it. 
I'rivate manufacturers can not help the situation for three or four 
months after they got their orders, says Gen. Wood. Listen to this 
sentence from the general's evidence : " The best estimates indicate 
that at the end of the first six months not to exceed 350,000 rounds 
could be procured from all sources, including the Government plant." 

Think of that ! Three hundred and fifty thousand rounds to be 
made in half a year. Why, Russia shot away 250,00 rounds in the 
nine days battle of Mukden alone. 

WHAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF WEOTE TO SECRETARY GAREISON. 

Seven weeks ago Maj. Gen. Witherspoon, Chief of Staff of the 
United States Army, wrote to the Secretary of War informing him that 
for the full equipment of an army of 800,000 men in case of war wc 
are short 400,000,000 rounds of rifie ammunition and 11,000,000 rounds 
of artillery ammunition. Of course, you gentlemen with your ideas will 
laugh to scorn the idea that we might possibly need 800,000 men in 
case of war. That is because you will not listen to unpalatable evi- 
dence. That is because you shun a real inquiry. Mr. Chairman Ilay, 
I asked you to summon Gen. Witherspoon ; I asked you to summon 
Gen. Wood ; and you flatly refused both requests. Yet President Wilson 
intimates that this committee can be trusted to make an adequate in- 
vestigation and an adequate report. How have you investigated? What 
have you done, I should like to know? Why, you summoned Gen. 
Crozier, who has been Chief of the Ordnance Department for 13 years, 
and you extracted from him the admission that his own work was 
most commendable. It is true that you put to him a few questions as 
to his recommendation for artillery and ammunition, but you didn't 
put the right questions. You did not drive home the questions which I 
would have driven home if I had not been muzzled. Why didn't you 
follow up the question of lieavy field guns when you had Gen. Crazier 
on the stand? Why didn't you ask him to point out why Germany 
uses 11-inch guiitt to batter covered trenches if 3-inch guns to scatter 
shrapnel are all that is needed? You know, Mr. Chairman, that the 
biggest movable gun in the United States Army is the G-inch howitzer, 
and we only have 32 of them completed. Yet the Germans have 16i- 
inch howitzers and 12J-inch howitzers and 8-inch mortars and the 
English have OJ-inch howitzers. What big guns the French may have 
I do not know. 

LITTLE AM. MUNITION. 

[Extract from the report of Brig. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of Ord- 
nance, United States Army, 191-1.] 

The amount of ammunition* on hand for field guns is far short of 
that considered advisable, although appropriations for this purpose 
have been materially increased. 

No permanent ammunition trains have been provided (p. 22). 

WHAT SECRETAHV GARRISON SAYS. 

[Extracts from the report of Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of 

War, 1914.] 

Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between 

nations, followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international courts 

of arbitration, and other greatly to be desired measures to lessen 

of prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all know that at 

77415—14417 



14 

present these conditions are not existing. We can and will eagerly 
adapt ourselves to each beneficent development along these lines ; Init to 
merely enfeeble ourselves in the meantime would, in my view, be 
unthinkable folly. By neglecting and refusing to provide ourselves with 
the necessary means of self-protection and self-defense we could not 
hasten or in any way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire 
in these respects. (P. 6.) 

»**•«♦« 

In continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 
30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men. 

We l;ave a reserve — that is, men who have been trained in the Army 
and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called 
back to the colors in time of war — consisting of IG men. 

The Organized Militia of the various States totals 8,323 officers and 
119,087 men. The enlisted men thereof are required, in order to obtain 
the financial aid which the Congress authorizes the Secretary of War 
to extend under certain conditions, to attend 24 drills a year and 5 
days annually In the field. If all of the National Guard could be 
summoned in the event of war, and should all respond (an inconceivable 
result), and if they were all found fairly efficient in the first line — that 
is, the troops who would be expected to immediately take the field — we 
could summon a force in this country of Regulars and National Guard 
amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men. 

And this Is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be 
volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready would 
take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months. 

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that 
in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the 
way to success in six montlis, if his antagonist had to wait six months 
to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede 
defeat without contest. 

For the purpose of information the following table is presented, 
showing the area, population, and military resources on a peace and 
war footing of other nations in comparison with ours : 



Germany 

France. ." 

Russia 

Great Britain and colonies 

Italy 

Austria-Hungary 

Japan 

Turkey 

Spain." 

Switzerland 

Sweden 

Belgium 

United States (including Philip 
pine Scouts) 



Land forces of various countries. 



Area 

(square 
miles). 



208,830 

207,054 

8,047,657 

11,467,294 

110,550 

261,035 

147,655 

1,186,874 

194,783 

15,976 

172,876 

11,373 

3,026,789 



Popula- 
tion. 



64,903,423 

38,961,945 

160,095,200 

396,294,752 

32,475,253 

49,418,596 

53,875,390 

35,764,876 

19,503,008 

3,741,971 

6,476,441 

7,074,910 

98,781,324 



Peace 
strength. 



020,000 

560,000 

1,200.000 

254,500 

275,000 

360,000 

230,000 

420,000 

115,000 

140,000 

75,000 

42,000 

97,760 



Total 
trained 

war 
strength. 



4,000,000 

3,000,000 

4,500,000 

1800,000 

1,200,000 

2,000,000 

1,200,000 

1,200,000 

300,000 

275,000 

400,000 

180,000 

2 225,170 



1 Excluding native army, 160,000. 

2 Including Organized Militia and Philippine Scouts. 



77413—14417 



15 

XIAJ. GEX. LEONARD WOOD'S WAnXING. 

Statement of facts by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wooti, United States 
Army, when Chief of Staff. Submittal December 9, lOirj; hear- 
ings on fortification bill, pages 13, 14, 15, and IG : 

I am submitting, for the informatioa of your com:t!ittoc, a statement 
which shows iu detail the condition of the lield artillery materiel 
of the United States Army and the available ammunition for tliese 
guns, and I trust that the members of this committee may lind time to 
read this, for it shows that we have neither guns nor ammunition 
sufficient to give any general commanding an army in the field any 
assurance of success if attacked by sn army of equal size which is 
supplied with its proper fjuota of field artillery. 

The fire of modern field artillery is so deadly that troops cau not 
advance over terrain swept by these guns without ))rohibitive losses. 
It is therefore necessary to neutralize the fire of hostile guns before our 
troops can advance, and the only way to neutralize the fire of this 
hostile field artillery is by field artillery guns, for troops armed with 
the small arms are as effectual against this fire until they arrive at 
about 2,000 yards from it as though they were armed with knives. 
This field artillery materiel and ammunition can not bo quickly ob- 
tained. In fact, the Chief of Ordnance estimates that almost one year 
wouJd be required to supply the field artillery guns needed with one 
field army of a little less than 70,000 men. No war within tlie past 
45 years has lasted for one year, so that after war is declared it 
would probably be over before we could manufacture an appreciable 
number of guns ; and the same applies to ammunition. 

The Ordnance Department states that by running night and day 
with three shifts Frankford Arsenal could turn our about 1,000 rounds 
of ammunition per day, and that if private raauufacturers were given 
orders to run under war conditions they could begin deliveries of am- 
munition iu from throe to four months, and after getting under way 
could turn out ai>out 100,000 or 200,000 rouuds per month for two or 
three months, and after a total time of six monllis the productioji 
would perhaps equal 250,000 rounds per month. The best estimates 
indicate that at the end of the first six montlis not to exceed 350,000 
rounds could be procured from all sources, including the Government 
plant. After this six months there would be no particular difliculty 
in securing ammunition as rapidly as might be needed. 

I will state to the committee that it is my belief that no modern war 
hetween first-class powers will last for one year, and unless privato 
manufacturers are now encouraged to manufacture ammunition for our 
guns after war is declared they will not be in any condition to do so 
until after the war is finished, and the supply of ammunition during 
the war will be limited to what the arsenals can turn out. At present 
this is about 1,000 rounds per day, running three shifts, and this ammu- 
nition, under ordinary battle conditions, could be fired by eight guns 
in one day of liattle. If guns are not supplied on the battle field with 
the ammunition which they can be reasonably expected to use, they are 
not efficient, and when a gun has exhausted the ammunition supplied 
it becomes as perfectly useless as junk ; in fact, it is worse than junk, 
for it must he protected by other troops. 

In the Russo-Japanese War the Russians expended during the war, 
exclusive of the action around Fort Artjjur, 954,000 rounds. 

At Mukden in nine days they expended 250,000 rounds. 
77415—14417 



16 

One battery of eigbt guns at Mukden fired 11,159 rounds, or 1,395 
rounds per gun. 

At Liaoyang eight Russian guns fired in three hours 2,500 rounds, or 
312 per gun. 

During August 30 and 31 the First and Third Siberians, with 16 bat- 
teries of 8 guns each, fired 108,000 rounds, or 844 rounds per gun. 

At Schaho, in a four-days fight, the artillery of the First Infantry 
Division — 48 guns — fired G02 rounds per gun. 

At this same battle in 45 minutes, 20 minutes of which were not 
occupied by firing, 42 guns fired 8,000 rounds, or 190 rounds per gun in 
25 minutes of actual firing. 

The War Department believes, after extended study, that in case of 
war with a first-class power an army of 500.000 meu will be needed to 
give this country any chance of success against invasion, and that this 
force will be needed at once. To make it efficient it must be given its 
proper quota of field artillery. To do this this artillery must be on hand, 
for it can not be supplied after war is started. A municipality might as 
well talk about buying its fire hose after the conflagration has started. 
A fire department without its proper equipment is worthless, irre- 
spective of the number of men it has ; and so would your armies, unless 
you provide in peace the material which will make them effective in 
war, (Pp. 13, 14, and 15.) 



I invite the attention of the committee to the fact that to October 
1, 1913, total appropriations have been made by your committee and 
the Military Committee for only 245,098 rounds of ammunition for our 
modern field guns. All of this ammunition will not be manufactured 
until June 30, 1914. 

Of this ammunition for modern guns we have at present in this 
countrj' — with troops, in depots, or under manufacture — 180,508 rounds ; 
and for the 2.95 mountain gun 15,106 rounds ; a total of 201,614 
rounds, and this is all we have. 

At Mukden in 9 days the 1,204 Russian guns expended 250,000 
rounds. 

The present daily output of the ordnance factories is, for three 
shifts running night and day, not above 1,600 rounds. It is at present 
manufacturing about 600 rounds of assorted sizes per day with one 
shift (p. 16). 

SHOETAGE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR FOR FIELD ARMY. 

(Table prepared from figures giveu on page 12 of the report 
of Maj. Geii. W. W. Wotlierspoon, Chief of Staff, United States 
Army, Nov. 15, 1914:) 



Munitions 
required as a 
reserve in an- 
ticipation of 
war. 



Munitions 
on hand or 
in process of 
manufacture. 



Rifles 

Rifle cartridges 

Field guns (exclusive of giant guns) 
Field-gim ammunition, rounds 

77415— 1J417 



C-12,M1 

646, OOl), 000 

2, S3-1 

11,790,«50 



69S, 374 

241,000,000 

8o2 

580, 098 



17 

AS TO COAST DEFENSES. 

[Extract from the report of Brijr. Gen. E. M. Weaver, Chief of Coast 
Artillery, United States Army, 1914.] 

From the foresoinj? it will be seen that the present authorized 
strength of the regular Coast Artillery Corps is short 5G4 office's and 
10.9.SS enlisted men of the strength required to man our coast defenses 
under the adopted policy outlined above. 

The defenses outside the continental United States are practically 
ready for their garrisons, and when these are rovided there Vvill re- 
main for home gun defenses 176 officers and 7,543 enlisted men, which 
is al)out one-third of one relief. 

In order to provide for our primary home defenses, to wit, coast 
defenses of Portland. Boston, Narra'^ansett Bay, Long Island Sound, 
eastern New York, southern New York, Cliesapeake Bay, Pensacola, San 
Francisco, and Puget Sound, there are required G62 officers and 10,251 
enlisted men. 

It will thus be seen that there are now provided about one-fourth of 
the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose. 
Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artil- 
lery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere 
caretaker detachments at some of the defenses of lesser importance, 
including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charleston, Savannah. Key West New 
Bedford, Potomac, Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear, and Mobile 
(p. 15). _ 

[Extract from the report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 

1914.] 
There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these coast 
defense's, the supply which the department has been attempting to main- 
tain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active 
operation of the guns in the United States proper and a two hours' full 
and active operation of the guns la over-sea fortifications. According 
to the report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the amount of ammunition 
now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 
per cent of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent for the 
mortars. * * * The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and 
searchlights are of., the most serious character. As a matter of fact, 
proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a 
limited number of lirst-class defense areas, the remainder of the fire- 
control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or im- 
provised (p. 0). 

CHESAPEAKE BAT UNFORTIFIED. 

[Extract from the report of the National Coast Defense Board, Feb. 

1, 1906.] 
Commercially and strategically, Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it al- 
ways has been, of the very first importance. With the entrance, as it is 
nov\r, unfortified, a hostile fieet, should it gain control of the sea, can 
establish, without coming under the fire of a single gun, a base on its 
shores, pass in and out at pleasure, have access to large quantities of 
valuable supplies of all kinds, and paralyze the great trunk railway lines 
crossing the head of the bay. (The situation is the same to-day as nine 
years ago, when the above was written. The entrance to Chesapeake 
Bay is still unfortified. A. P. G.) 
77415—14417 



18 

KXEXiy COULD LAND. 

[Extract from the cvideuce of Rear Admiral Frank F. Fliitobcr, Dec. 0, 

1914.] 

Kepresentative WiTiiEnsrooN. How many iinliarbored places arc there 
on tbc coast where they (the enemy) could land? 

Admiral Fletcher. In smooth water and fine weather, they could laud 
almost any place, as we did from the open .sea at Santiago. (P. o3G, 
oflicial printed hearings of House Committee on Naval Affairs. 

THE KAXGE OF OUH COA.ST GUNS. 

Correspoudeuce between tlie Secretary of War ami Congress- 
man A. P. Gardner relative to tbe comparative range of foreign 
naAal guns ami tlie guns of our seacoast defenses: 

WA.sniNGTOX, D. C, December I'l, lOI'i. 
The honorable the Secuetary of War. 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : Would you he kind enough to answer the 
following (juestions : 

1. How many 14-inch guns are there in tho coast defenses of the 
United States, and where arc they .situated? 

2. Arc there any guns of a larger number of inches in caliber, except 
the 16-inch gun destined for the Panama Canal? 

3. Referring to page 7 of the current report of the Chief of Coast 
Artillery, how large is the caliber of the guns which " foreign warships 
of the latest design are carrying"? 

4. IJow much do these foreign guns outrange our 14-iuch guns? 

5. How much do they out-range our 12-inch guns? 

Very respectfully, 

December 15, 1014. 
Hon. A. P. Gardner^ 

House of Ecprcsentaiiirs. 

My Dear Mr. Gardner : I am in receipt of your letter of even dato 

and answer the inquiries therein as follows : 

1. None. 

2. No. 

o. 15-inch, 45 calibers. 

4. The guns just mentioned carry at their maximum elevation 21,000 
yards. Our 14-inch guns if mounted so as to shoot at their maximum 
elevation would carry as far. On the present carriage they would carry 
18,000 yards. 

5. The foreign guns, just mentioned, as above stated, carry at their 
maximum elevation 21,000 yards?. Our 12-inch guns on their standard 
carriage carry 13,000 yards. They could be mounted so as to carry 
a similar distance to the foreign guns just mentioned. 

In regard to the question that you put to me orally at your visit 
yesterday afternoon I repeat the ansv,fcr which I made to you. In view 
of the increased size and caliber of guns now on, or contemplated to be 
placed on, naval vessels and the caliber, mounting, and range of our 
coast defense guns and the question which has arisen as to their de- 
fensive strength against the offensive strength of naval ships with their 
increased armament I had ordered a board to study this question and 
report to me thereon, 

Sincerelj', yours, Lixdley M. Garrison, 

Secretary of War. 
77415—14417 



19 

Refokt of the Chief of Staff. 

War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 

Washinoton, November 15, 191i. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report for the period 
from April 22, 1914, to November 15, 1914 : 

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY. 

According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, 
exclusive of the Philippine Scouts, is 4,572 ofiiccrs and 88,444 enlisted 
men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 
enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 enlisted mea 
below its authorized strength. 

Of the total present enlisted strength of the Army, 22.50 per cent, 
including recruits and recruiting parties, belongs to the noncombatant 
and noneffective class, and is not with the colors ; 19.45 per cent is 
in that branch whose special function is coast defense ; and 58.05 per 
cent belongs to the mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, 
and Infantry). 

Of the actual strength of the Army from the latest returns, 1,067 
officers and 19,899 enlisted men (including recruits and men engaged in 
recruiting) belong to the staff, technical, and noncombatant branches of 
the Army. 

Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 enlisted men belong 
to the Coast Artillery and 2,738 officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong 
to the mobile army (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry). 

MOBILE ARMY. 

The total strength of the field or mobile forces in our Army is there- 
fore less than 52,000 enlisted men. If from this strength the noncom- 
batants and noneffectives. l>elonging to the regimental, troop, battery, 
and company organizations, such as the noncommissioned staff, mu- 
sicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which aggregate 5,376, are deducted, the 
actual lighting strength of the Army with the colors, and without de- 
ductions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached service, etc., 
•would be 2,738 officers and 45,968 enlisted men. 

There are in the line of the United States Regular Army (includ- 
ing Coast Artillery), not including the two battalions of the Forte 
lUcan Regiment, 65 regimental and 758 troop, battery, and company 
organizations. Under existing laws there belong to these organiza- 
tions 322 regimental field officers and 2,358 company officers. Of 
these officers, according to latest returns, 93 field and 675 company 
officers arc at present absent from their commands on detached serv- 
ice, on leave, or sick. This important branch of the Army is therefore 
at the present time 28.656 per cent short of the officers who are 
deemed necessary under existing laws for its instruction, training, 
and discipline. As the department draws mainly upon the units of 
the forces in the United States proper for officers for detached serv- 
ice, maintaining as far as possible the full complement of officers with 
the organizations on foreign service, the percentage of regimental 
and company officers absent from their organizations is far higher 
for those organizations in the United States thau the above percentage 
would indicate. 

77415—14417 



20 

DI.STEIBVTION OP TUB MOBILE ARMY. 

The enlisted men of the mobile Army are distributed as follows : 

In the United States proper 30,481 

In our foreign possessions 20, 8G3 

Distributed as follows : 

In the rhilippines 7, 212 

In the Hawaiian Islands C, 832 

In the Panama Canal Zone 1, G81 

In China COO 

In Alaska 431 

In Vera Cruz 3, 434 

In Porto Itican Regiment 583 

Of the enlisted men of Ihe mobile Army in the United States, 
18,954 are in the Celd in Texas and on the Mexican border, 1,GG5 are 
in the lield in Colcrado, 245 are temporarily in Montana, 300 are in 
Arkansas, and only 9,317 are at their home or permanent stations. 
It may be added that the department is under the necessity of dis- 
patching in the near future at least one additional regiment of In- 
fantry to Panama, and that this action will still further reduce by 
at least 1,200 the number of troops of the mobile Army remaining 
within our continental limits. 

MATfiKIEL FOK THE MAINTKXAN'CE OF TJIE MOBILE ARMY. 

A fairly adequate supply of ammunition and other materiel to main- 
tain the mobile army in the field for a period of six months is now 
on hand and available. 

COA.ST ARTILLERY CQEP.S. 

As to the Coast Artillery branch of the Army, the strength of that 
corps must necessarily depend on the number and character of the 
coast defenses which it is required to man. Its strength has no rela- 
tion to the strength of the mobile Army other than that the strength 
of the latter must be adequate to protect the fortified positions from 
attack from the rear. 

ITnder the present approved policy of the War Department the Coast 
Artillery defenses in our foreign possessions are to be manned entirely 
by organizations belonging to the regular service. The Coast Artillery 
defenses in the United States proper are to be manned at the rate of 
50 per cent of the gun and mortar defenses by the Coast Artillery Corps 
of the Organized Militia. 

The strength of the Coast Artillery of the Kegular Army, from latest 
returns, is 740 ofliicers and 17,201 enlisted men. The estimate of the 
Chief of Coast Artillery shows that 1,312 officers and 30,309 enlisted 
men of the Kegular Army in addition to the 740 officers and 18,531 
enlisted men of the Organized Militia required to man 50 per cent of 
the gun and mortar defenses in the United States are necessary to mnu 
the soacoast defenses now existing at home and in our foreign posses- 
sions. As the authorized strength of that corps of tlie Regular Army 
is 748 officers and 19,019 enlisted men, it is at present 2 officers and 
1,818 enlisted men below its authorized strength and 5G6 officers and 
13,108 enlisted men below the necessities as estimated by the Chief of 
Coast Artillery, in addition to the deficiencies in the Coast Artillery 
Corps of the Organized Militia. The total deficiencies in the Coast 
Artillery Corps of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia are, 
therefore, 85G officers and 24,489 enlisted men. 
77415—11417 



21 

DISTRIBDTION OV THK COAST APTILLERY. 

The companies of the Coasi Artillery Corps are distributed aa 
follows : 

Companios. 
On the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts of the United States proper — 140 

In Texas (equipped and acting as infantry) 5 

In our foreign possessions 25 

That is: 

In the Philippine Islands 11 

In the Hawaiian Islands 8 

In the Panama Canal Zone 6 

The aggregate enlisted strength of the Coast Artillery Corps required 
to man the coast defenses in the United States is reported by the Chief 
of Coast Artillery to be 24,075 ; the actual number available is 14,033. 
The aggregate enlisted strength required to man the coast defenses in 
foreign possessions now completed, or to be completed in the near 
future, as reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery, is 6,234 ; the actual 
number now in those possessions is 2,568. It therefore appears tliat 
there is a deficiency of 9,442 enlisted men for the home coast defenses 
and 3,606 for those in our foreign possessions. 

Naval armament in the last few years has rapidly developed, par- 
ticularly in respect to the caliber of the guns, their ranges, and the 
rapidity with which fire from these guns can be delivered. At the pres- 
ent time the tendency is to place on the higher type of battleships guns 
as large as 15 inches in caliber. These guns, whilst carrying a projec- 
tile of less weight than those used with our direct-fire type of seacoast 
guns, have, owing to the greater lenglft of the guns and the higher 
powder pressures used, a very distinct advantage in range, their range 
exceeding that of our 14-inch guns from 2,000 to 3,000 yards. Whilst 
this advantage in range is to a degree offset by the instability of the 
naval platforms and the less accurate methods of obtaining ranges from 
ships than from land defenses, there still appears to remain a distinct 
advantage in this respect, which, coupled with the number of these 
caliber guns now being carried on the stronger type of naval ships, 
makes it necessary to give careful consideration to the question whether 
there should not be a change, not only in the length, caliber, and 
powder pressures of our heavier type of guns, but whether there should 
not be a change in the emplacements so as to give overhead protection 
to the crews operating the guns. In other words, it is my opinion that 
careful consideration should be given, at least in the establishment of 
new defense districts, to the question of the caliber, length, and range 
of the seacoast guns, as well as to the question whether the turret sys- 
tem for the protection of the gun and its crew should not be adopted, 
in order to put the land defenses somewhat nearer on a parity with the 
naval guns wliich arc liable to attack them. As a fleet of 8 battle- 
ships of the most modern type can throw against a single target 118 
projectiles per minute, the danger that must arise from the possibility 
of fragments of these shells and the debris thrown up from their im- 
pact against the concrete parapets which protect the guns, to the crews 
as well as to the delicate and complicated machinery which operates 
the guns, would indicate that overhead protection against such frag- 
ments should be provided in order to insure the most effective operation 
of the coast armament. 

MATfiRIEL FOR THE COAST ARTILLERY DEFENSES. 

Materiel for the coast artillery defeases as at present established 
and under construction is fairly adequate in the matter of guns, 
77415—14417 



■"^ 



22 

mortars, and mine materiel. There is a serious ilefieiimcy, however, 
in ammunition for these defenses, the supply which the department 
has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately 
an liour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States 
proper and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in 
over-sea fortifications. According to the report of the Chief of Coast 
.\rtillery the amount ot ammunition now available and provided for 
by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent of this requirement 
for the guns and 50 per cent for the mortars. The amount of ex- 
plosive necessary to load and operate the mines now provided at our 
various coast defenses for one charge is complete. The deficiencies in 
the matter of Arc control and searchlights are of the most serious 
character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight 
installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class 
defense areas, the remaindei of the fire-control systems and searchlight 
equipment being deficient or improvised. 

OKGANIZED MILITIA. 

According to the latest returns, the total reported strength of the 
Organized Militia is 8,32.3 officers and 110,087 enlisted men. Of this 
force, 8.j5 officers and 5,020 enlisted men belong to the staff and non- 
combatant branches, 450 officers and 7,150 enlisted men belong to the 
Coast Artillery, and 7,018 officers and 100,911 enlisted men to the 
mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry). 
Of this force there were present at the annual inspection C92 officers 
and 4,090 enlisted men of the staff corps, 439 officers and 5,989 enlisted 
men of the Coast Artillery, aqd 6,553 officers and 85,541 enlisted men 
of the mobile forces, a total absenteeism from inspection of G39 officers 
and 23,407 enlisted men. Reports as to the attendance at camps of 
instruction show that 5GS officers and 3,744 enlisted men of the staff 
corps, 423 officers and 0,135 enlisted men of the Coast Artillery, and 
5,904 officers and 77,353 enlisted men of the mobile forces attended 
theoe camps of instruction, showing a total absenteeism of 1,428 offi- 
cers and 31,855 enlisted men from these camps. 

As regards practice with the rifle, there were 111,140 officers and men 
in organizations armed with the rifle. The total number who fired the 
rifle during the range-practice season, 1913 (the last report available), 
was 66,974. The total number who fired the rifle during the range- 
practice season, 1913, and qualified as second-class men or better, was 
42,599 officers and men. 

From the above figures it will he seen that only 81.07 per cent of the 
total reported strength of officers and men of the Organized Militia 
attended the annual inspections ; that only 73.87 per cent of officers and 
men attended the camps of instruction ; that the number of men who 
had any practice with the rifle during the target season 1913 was 52.30 
per cent ; and that the number who qualified as second-class men or 
better was 33.43 per cent. 

The requirements of the regulations arc that units of the Organized 
Militia shall have at least 24 drills of one hour each per annum. Re- 
ports indicate that whilst in a majority of States these requirements 
were fully met as regards the organizations, yet in a majority of or- 
ganizations there v.'ere a number of enlisted men who failed to attend 
24 times for drill and instruction during the calendar year 1913. The 
total number so failing to attend during the year 1913 was 37,874 men 
out of a total of 119,087. 

There is no indication of the number of practice marches held by the 
units of the Organized Militia during the year, and it is believed to be 
77415—14417 



23 

a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength 
marched a distance of 10 miles fully equipped and armed. 

The above figures, taken in conjunction with the fact that the num- 
ber of companies, troops, batteries, etc., is 2,000, and that of this num- 
ber, 1,120 organizations are below the prescribed minimum strength, 
would indicate to a degree the dependence to be placed upon this force. 

As organized the militia is deficient in the following units to make 
it a properly balanced and efficient field force : 

Cavalry, number of troops 54 

Field Artillery, number of batteries 79 

Engineers, number of companies 14 

Ambulance companies 34 

Field hospitals 12 

The deficiency in its Coast Artillery branch is 200 oflicers and 11,381 
enlisted men. 

As to the materiel necessary to put this force into the field and main- 
tain it there for a period of six months, there is a very decided defi- 
ciency in many important respects. For instance, there are but 550 
horses available for the use in drill and instruction of the Cavalry, 
which aggregates 4,940 oflJicers and enlisted men. The deficiency in 
horses for the Field Artillery is even greater than that of the Cavalry. 
There are no animals for the signal or sanitary troops. As regards 
wagon transportation, the militia as now organized is deficient 1,934 
wagons. Should the militia be assembled into divisions and separate 
brigades, the deficit would be 5,836 wagons. There are no draft ani- 
mals available. These deficiencies in materiel are very important, 
inasmuch as they must be supplied before the Organized Militia forces 
can be made available for field operations. 

As regards Field Artillery materiel for the Organized Militia, should 
this force be called into service with its present number of batteries, 
the total amount of ammunition necessary therefor would be 1,300,000 
rounds of 3-inch ammunition, based on an average of 5,000 rounds per 
gun, which is equivalent to the best standards of supply of this char- 
acter of ammunition in foreign armies. To completely equip the 
proper number of batteries for the 12 militia divisions, including the 
auxiliary divisions, there would be required, in addition to materiel 
now in the hands of the Organized Militia, 316 field guns and 1,322,384 
rounds of ammunition. 

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. 

If it is deemed that the condition and strength of our military estab- 
lishment (including the Organized Militia) as above set forth Is satis- 
factory and adequate to our needs at home and in our foreign posses- 
sions under modern conditions and existing circumstances, there appears 
to be no necessity for special action beyond maintaining that estab- 
lishment at its present strength and in about its present condition. 
To make even this force effective, however, by proper training and 
instruction, a number of additional officers and noncommissioned officers 
of the Regular Army are urgently needed — first, in order that a full 
complement of these instructors may be kept with the units of the 
Regular Army ; second, that we may have available an adequate corps 
of trained instructors for the militia. 

In case, however, the strength and condition of that establishment as 

set forth is deemed inadequate and unsatisfactory. It is pertinent to 

make suggestions as to what should be done to correct this condition 

and provide a military establishment adequate to our needs and respou- 

77415—14417 



24 

sibililies. These suggestions, in my opinion, sliould be based upon study 
of conditions as tliey are in our country and in our foreign possessions, 
including borne needs and the needs which might arise in our relations 
With other countries. 

In looking over the strength of our garrisons in foreign possessions 
it becomes at once manifest that the garrisons we arc maintaining there 
or propose to maintain there under tlie scheme of distribution of our 
Army as it exists at present are entirely inadequate to the needs of 
those possessions That an effective defense against an enterprising 
enemy in the Philippines could be made with a deflciency of 33 per cent 
of the manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay 
and with a mobile force of a little over 7,000 American troops, supple- 
mented by less than 0,000 Tbilippine Scouts, is manifestly impossible ; 
that the great waterway of the Panama Canal can not be protected 
against the operations of a first-class military power by the present or 
proposed garrison we contemplate placing there without the power and 
ability to reenforce it rapidly by troops from the United States is 
equally manifest ; that wo can retain our valuahle Territory of Alaska 
in its isolated position against an enemy with any military power by 
placing there a garrison of less than 500 men verges on the ridiculous 
unless we have ample forces at home to occupy that Territory in the 
very earliest stages of an impending conflict. As regards the Hawaiian 
Islands, all military persons will recognize that the proposed garrison in 
this possession is far below what it should be to meet a serious attack 
unless, in this case again, we have an adequate force on the Pacific 
coast ready to dispatch to the islands when trouble is impending. It 
must therefore be frankly admitted that the present garrisons of these 
outlying possessions are entirely inadequate for the purpose for which 
they have been sent there, and that without a material change in con- 
ditions at home wo have uo available resources from which to reenforce 
them, even should time be given to us to do so. As the Philippines are 
too distant from the United States to be reenforced when war is im- 
pending, it would seem necessary that the garrison of those islands 
should be at least a full manning detail for the Coast Artillery de- 
fenses and one complete division at full war strength plus the necessary 
administrative staff. As to our other outlying possessions, it may be 
said that the garrisons proposed for those possessions, with the excep- 
tion of Alaska, may be coQsidered adequate only under the contingency 
that we have available in the United States sufficient thoroughly trained 
troops in excess of our home needs to warrant us in heavily reenforcing 
the peace garrisons. 

As to the necessities within the continental limits of the United 
States, whilst our isolation by water from the other great powers is an 
undoubted protection, that protection is limited by two main factors : 

First. The power of our fleet to protect the country from invasion 
over those seas. 

Second. Our ability to assemble rapidly at the points of debarkation 
selected by an enemy an adequate force to delay, if not prevent, his 
effecting a lodgment on our shores. 

Whether or not our Navy is adequate for the purpose indicated, 
i. e., to protect our country from over seas, is a question beyond the 
scope of this report. That we can not, with our present strength, 
rapidly assemble a sufficient force, fully equipped for field operations, 
to meet such an expedition as might be dispatched against our shores 
is evident. The very fact that an enemy traversing the seas would 
have a wide choice of landing points, or points of attack, at once 
evidences the difficulties attending the assembly of organizations of 
77415—14417 



25 

sufficient strength to meet him at the point he may select. It there- 
fore appears to be necessary that the general distribution of forces to 
meet such a situation would be on a very M'ide front if prompt opposi- 
tion to a landing is to be effected. 

Fortunately there is no apparent need for garrisons of any great 
strength on our northern frontier. This, however, is not true as 
regards our southern frontier, where for the greater part of the last 
three years we have been compelled gradually to increase the number 
of troops until at the present time over two-thirds of the mobile forces 
of our Army in the United States are concentrated. 

Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability 
and necessity for having at all times available at home and, in addi- 
tion to the necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of 
our military establishment a mobile force of at least 500,000 thor- 
oughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men, with adequate 
supplies for the operation of this force for a period of at least six 
months. This is a conclusion that seems to have been reached by all 
those who have given careful consideration to this question. It is 
also agreed that we should have, as a second line, a thoroughly 
equipped and trained force of Organized Militia of not less than 300,000 
men, properly proportioned as to its staff and several arms, with stores 
and supplies necessary for its operation in the field for a like period. 
The smaller units of the standing Army and the corresponding units 
of the Organized Militia must manifestly be organized into the higher 
units of brigades and divisions and be susceptible of assembly for drill 
and field exercises, for without such organization and power of assembly 
the troops themselves, not to speak of the higher commanders, would be 
without that experience which is essential to effective operation in war. 

As stated elsewhere in this, report, the strength of the Coast Artillery 
Corps bears no relation to the strength of these mobile forces ; that 
corps is charged with the manning and the oj^eration of the seacoast 
defenses. The mobile Army, on the other hand, must not only be pre- 
pared to meet the forces of the enemy after they have effected a lodg- 
ment on our coast, but must be prepared, at least in the initial stages 
of war, to guard all the fortified positions on our coasts from attack 
from the rear by landing parties from naval vessels and such transports 
as they may be able to convoy. While the strength of the Coast Artil- 
lery Corps therefore depends upon the number of fortified positions it 
has to operate, the strength of the mobile forces will depend upon the 
number of fortified positions it must defend from attack from the rear 
or tui-ning point, plus the necessities which may arise to meet and op- 
pose the landing of an expeditionary force in a region beyond the range 
of our seacoast guns. 

In any scheme to create such a force of mobile troops, as is above 
contemplated, we can not do better than to follow the example of the 
master minds in military organization for national defense. The poli- 
cies developed in this direction all include, amongst others, the primary 
plan of using the standing Army as a school for the training of men 
who, on graduation from that school, pass into the reserve and consti- 
tute the real national military strength. Experience has shown that 
from two to three years of active service in the standing Army is the 
lowest possible limit of time within which the average man can be con- 
verted into a disciplined, trained, and effective soldier. After passing 
through the school and gaining experience, the men under this plan are 
separated from the active Army and go into the reserve for periods 
varying from five to a r^reater number of years, being held at all times, 
whilst allowed during peace to pursue with the utmost freedom sucli 
77415—14417 



2G 

civil occupations as tliey_ may select, under obligation to respond to a 
call to the colorf; in case of national need. This system is economical 
in the highest degree, as the officers and men receive pay only during 
their active service, and, on being called to the colors, the period spent 
in the reserves involving no expense in the way of emoluments. 

In arriving at a conclusion as to what the size of the regular m'l)ilo 
army should be, in order that the country jnay eventually and within a 
reasonable time have a military establishment adequate to its needs, it 
is necessary to decide what the size of the Regular, or standing. Army 
should be in order to provide the 500,000 men believed to be necessary 
with the colors and in the reserves. Assuming the adoption of a short 
term of enlistm.ent — say, three years — for the passage of the men thor- 
oughly trained in the school of the Regular, or standing. Army into the 
reserve, and that men so trained should not be held in the tirst reserve 
for a longer period than five years, it would appear that the size of the 
Regular, or standing, Army to be used as a school for the training of 
reservists should be about 205,000 enlisted men. If from such an army, 
organized on a basis of three years' training, we discharge yearly that 
increment below the grade qt sergeant which had completed its three 
years' training, we would have, with duo allowance for deaths, etc., in 
the first year of its complete operation an army of 263,700 (205,000 
plus 58,700 reserves) ; in the second year an army of 322,400 (205,000 
plus 117,400 reserves) ; in the third year an army of .381,100 (205,000 
plus 176,100 reserves) ; in the fourth year an army of 439,800 (205,000 
plus 234,800 reserves) ; in the fifth year an army of 498,500 (205,000 
plus 293,500 reserves). After this the Army would l)e maintained at 
the last figure, and in addition we would be accumulating trained men 
in the second reserve at the rate of about 55,000 each year. 

The rule as to the acciimulation of reserves for the operation of the 
Coast Artillery Corps does not seem to have the same force as when 
that principle is applied to the mobile army, inasmuch as it is neces- 
sary for the Coast Artillery at all times to man their defenses with 
practically the full complement, and that corps, as it is not charged 
with any greater requirements as to strength iu war than in peace, 
does not require expansion in war. However, the principle applies to a 
degree, at least, to this corps in order that its ranks may at all times 
be readily filled with experienced men when war is imminent. 

Whether our country could adopt the principle of creating a reserve 
without compensation to the reservists whilst not actively serving with 
the colors is doubtful, but it would seem that a small remuneration 
might be given for the retention of their services. 

No reason is seen why the same principle as to reserves should not 
))e applied to the Organized Militia, and the men trained in its units 
be bound for service for a period corresponding to that of the re- 
servists for (he Regular Army. It must, however, be admitted that 
unless there be a material change in the laws governing the Organ- 
ized Militia which will bring about a greater reliance upon and an 
increased control by the General Government, that branch of our mili- 
tary establishment can not be regarded and depended upon as a 
reliable force. Such a modification in the law to meet this end might 
be brought about by placing the Organized Militia under pay by the 
General Government and, imdcr a binding obligation, to serve at its 
call. This, it is thought, would produce a state of affairs where the 
Organized Militia will be much more thoroughly trained than it possi- 
bly can be under existing laws, and to that extent can be more surely 
depended upon. la .any regulations or modifications of law looking to 
the better organization of the militia as a national force it naturally 
77415—14417 



27 

follows that the United States should have the power to create in the 
Organized Militia that parity of the several arms of the service and 
staff which is essential for effective operations in war. It should also 
have the power to detach from the Regular Army such numbers of 
officers and noncommissioned officers as it may find necessary to place 
on duty with the Organized Militia to aid and assist the officers of 
that branch of the national defense in a thorough training of the units. 
The question of supplies and equipment necessary to make such 
forces as we may organize effective is of primary importance. No 
matter what size force we may have, it will be ineffective without proper 
and adequate supplies and equipment. It would therefore appear 
that we should establish depots in which should be deposited all those 
supplies necessary to the effective operation of our Army which can not 
be readily and rapidly procured in the first stages of war. 

OUR SUPPLY OP MUNITIONS MOST NECESSAKY IN WAK. 

No attempt will be made to enter into particulars as to the character 
of supplies that it will be necessary to accumulate and store for the use 
of such forces as are contemplated in the above scheme ; that is, a 
regular mobile army, including its reserves of 500,000 men, and a 
force of 300,000 mobile Organized Militia troops, including its reserves. 
One illustration will be sufficient, and that will be taken from the 
munitions most necessary in war, as rifles and field artillery. The 
proper proportion of rifles in a force of this character, including the 
Cavalry, which is armed with the rifle, would be 642,541. The mini- 
mum accumulated supply of rifle ammunition, based on 1,000 rounds 
per rifle, should be 640,000,000 rounds. The proper proportion of field 
and heavy guns of the mobile type, and exclusive of the gigantic en- 
gines of war of more recent introduction, drawn by tractors, no types 
of which have as yet been developed in this country, would be 2,834. 
The ammunition for this type of guns, based upon a supply of 5,000 
rounds per light field gun, with a corresponding proportion for the 
heavier field guns, a conservative estimate, if we regard the examples of 
the great military nations, would be 11,790,850 rounds. It is sufficient 
to point out that at the present time we have on hand and being manu- 
factured 098,374 United States rifles (model 1903) and 241,000,000 
rounds of ammunition for these rifles, 852 field guns and 580,098 
rounds of ammunition for these guns. The number of guns per thou- 
sand men used in the calculation as to the total number required in the 
above estimate as to force is five, that number being considerably below 
the average in European armies. It should also he remembered that 
large numbers of guns and large masses of ammunition are, in an 
active war. liable to capture and destruction, and that to start into field 
operations with the expectation that the proportions given will he 
maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious. 
As the factories and works in this country which can produce munitions 
of war of the above character are exceedingly limited, it is evident that 
a full supply of this type of materiel must be stored and ready for use 
before war is undertaken. 

DEPOTS. 

As regards the depots in which supplies for the military establish- 
ment should be stored, their distribution should be in the immediate 
Ticinity of the troops, both of the Regular Army and the Organized 
Militia, which are to be equipped from them. The distances in this 
great country between the present limited number of depots and the 
stations of the troops or the areas from which the troops will mainly be 
drawn, are so great that an effective distribution from them to troops 
77415—14417 



28 

organized under the general scheme here contemplated would he inef- 
fective in that it would consume a great amount of the limited time 
which modern warfare indicates would he at the disposal of a country 
suhject to attack whose plans contemplate the mobilization of its forces 
only after war is immiment or has been declared. 

OrERATIO^'S OF THE AHMY. 

On the 22d of April, 1914, the naval forces occupied the city of Vera 
Cruz, Mexico. In accordance with the directions of the Tresident, so 
much of the Fifth ]3rigade of the Second Division, with certain 
auxiliary troops, as could be accommodated on the transports at that 
time available, were ordered dispatched from Galveston, Tex., to Vera 
Cruz. Brig, Gen. Frederick Funston, with 225 oflaccrs and 3,832 
enlisted men and a limited amount of transportation, sailed with the 
major portion of his reenforced brigade from Galveston on the 24th 
of April and arrived at Vera Cruz on the 28th of April. At noon on 
the 30th of April, Gen. Funston took over the command of the city 
of Vera Cruz from the naval authorities, and with his force of 3,832 
enlisted men of the Army and 3,333 enlisted men of the United States 
Marine Corps, ordered to report to him for duty, making a total 
enlisted force of 7,1C5 men, occupied the immediate suburbs of the city, 
and extended his lines to include El Tejar, about 9 miles distant, 
where the main source of fresh water supply for the city is located. 
A large proportion of the reenforced brigade was necessarily left in 
Galveston on April 24, due to the lack of water transportation facilities. 
Owing to changed conditions subsequent to the occupation of the city 
of Vera Cruz by our forces, the oi'iginal strength of Gen. Funston's 
command which lauded at Vera Cruz has not been augmented, and 
certain elements of the brigade which properly belong to it, such as 
parts of its Field Artillery, Cavalry, and transportation, have been 
retained ever since at Galveston. The latest reports indicate that 
the enlisted forces of his command have now shrunk to about 3,434 
men of the Army and 2,-500 men of the Marine Corps, an aggregate 
enlisted strength of 5,934, this shrinkage arising mainly, so far as the 
Army is concerned, from the discharge of time-expired men and 
sickness. 

The healtli of the command during the time it has been in Vera 
Cruz has, owing to the unremitting attention given to sanitation, been 
remarkably good, the sick rate steadily decreasing until, as indicated 
by the last i-eports, it was between 1.35 and 1.93 per cent. 

It is due to this command to call particular attention to its having 
been able to avoid friction with the foreign elements of the population 
and the armed forces" which have at all times confronted it. The 
situation was a delicate one and called for the greatest tact on the 
part of both officers and men. No instances have been brought to the 
attention of the department of any serious friction between the troops 
and the inhabitants of Vera Cruz or with the armed bodies of Mexicans 
outside the city. 

The 1,703 miles of Mexican border from Brownsville, Tex., to the 
vicinity of San Diego, Cal., was, on the 22d of April, kept under 
observation and patrolled to the extent possible by 359 officers and 
8,2G0 enlisted men under the command of Brig. Gen. Tasker II. Bliss, 
who, as commanding general of the Southern Department, controls 
the border from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Colorado River, 
and Maj. Gen. Arthur Murray, who, as commanding general of the 
Western Department, controls the border from the Colorado River 
to the Pacific coast. 
77415—14417 



29 

When the news of the occupation of the city of Vera Cruz by United 
States forres i-eached the border a marlced increase of the feeling of 
uneasiness and apprehension became manifest, both on the Mexican 
and on our side. Conditions there became such that it was deemed 
advisable to malje a material increase of the forces at the disposal of 
the comminding general of the Southern Department, and to that end 
the Eighth Brigade from the Western Department, the Second Brigade 
from the Eastern Department, the Sixth Field Artillery from the Cen- 
tral Department, and five companies of the Coast Artillery Corps from 
the coast-defense district of the Gulf, aggregating 193 officers and 
5,543 enlisted men, were ordered to report to tlie commanding general 
of the Southern Department for assignment to station, and were by 
him distributed along the border. This movement, together with the 
changes made in the Western Department, brought the strength of the 
Regular Army forces on the border and in Texas up to over 20.000 
men. The duties performed by these troops have been of a very arduous 
and exacting character. Living for the most part under canvas or 
improvised shelter, they have had the task of patrolling and guarding 
the very long lino, much of which is desert, all of it exceedingly hot. 
They have been called upon to prevent not only the iScursion of hostile 
parties into our own territory, but to receive and disaMn considerable 
numbers of Mexican troops driven into our territory by stress of war. 
A good part of the time has been spent by the troops in efforts to 
prevent the passage of munitions of war from entering into Mexican 
territory. Wliilst it was impossible under conditions to accomplish 
fully the task of preventing the passage of these munitions across the 
border, great success has attended the efforts to stop the incursion 
of armed parties and to disarm Mexican troops driven into our territory. 
First and last, over 5,000 Mexicans driven into our territory were dis- 
armed and held as prisoners until very recently, when they were re- 
leased, and the enlisted men amongst them returned to their own country. 
The total approximate cost attending the care and maintenance of these 
prisoners was over $719,883. The skill and forbearance shown by the 
officers and men in this arduous frontier service warrants the highest 
commendation, particularly in view of the fact that in their operations 
1 of our men has been killed and 9 wounded by bullets fired from the 
Mexican side of the border ; in addition, a number — about 20 — of our 
citizens have been killed and wounded in like manner. Conditions on 
the frontier continue to be such as to give little hope of relief coming 
in the near future to these troops, many of whom have been absent 
from their permanent stations, living in tents, for over two years. 

Late in the month of April, 1914, a situation arose in the coal 
regions of Colorado which necessitated the disp'atch of United States 
troops to that region. The Eleventh Cavalry, from Fort Oglethorpe", 
Ga., the second squadron ot the Fifth Cavalry, from Fort Leavenworth, 
and seven troops of the Twelfth Cavalry, from the Central Department, 
were sent, and have been on duty there ever since. Good order has been 
preserved by the troops since they have been there, and no overt acts 
of a serious character have been committed in the regions under their 
control. 

Early in the month of September conditions in Butte, Mont., were of 
such a character as to render it necessary for the governor to dispatch 
the militia of that State to the Butte region, and, incident to this state 
of affairs, a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was moved from Fort 
Wright, Wash., to Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont. Recently it 
•was found necessary to transfer this battalion to Fort Missoula, where 
it is now temporarily stationed. 
77415—14417 



30 

Eai'ly in Xovombor conditions in tlie coal regions of Arkansas de- 
veloped to a state where it was deemed necessary to dispatch troops to 
that region in support of the United States courts. The first squadron 
of the Fifth Cavalry was ordered to proceed to Fort Smith, Ark., for 
duty. These troops arc still on duty in the State of Arkansas. 

Owing to the pressing necessity for troops for more important duties 
and with a view to their being better prepared for the purpose for 
wiiich troops are maintained, early in the year orders were issued 
relieving the troops to a great extent from the guarding of the national 
parks, and leaving these parks under the control of the Interior Depart- 
ment. To this end, the troops dispatched to the Yosemitc National 
Park, Cal., were withdrawn ; the usual orders for the guards to proceed 
to the Sequoia and Grant Parks were not issued, and the second 
squadron of the First Cavalry, with its machine-gun platoon, was re- 
lieved from duty in the Yellowstone Park and ordered to join its regi- 
ment in California, a military guard consisting of a detachment of 
about 200 mounted men drawn generally from thei Cavalry of the Army 
being left at the Yellowstone Park to perform the duties heretofore per- 
formed by the troops relieved. 

Very respectfully, W. W. Wother.spoon, 

Major General, Chief of Staff. 

The Sechetary of War. 
77415—14417 



o 



